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Abstract—We study battery filling policies with hard deadlines
when the supply of energy can be modulated. This occurs for
example with an electric plug-in vehicle using an adjustable
electricity service for charging; such a service is offered in
some countries as a means to provide flexibility to operators,
and typically involves non-scheduled service reductions combined
with a service guarantee that constrains these reductions. The
problem for the battery user is to determine a charging policy,
which we call a “consumption policy”, that meets a given “full
battery” deadline while minimizing the energy cost (i.e. the bill
paid to the electricity provider). As the charging efficiency is
diminishing with respect to consumption, it is not optimal to
charge as much and as early as possible. On the other hand
service reductions cannot be predicted but it is possible to gain
some information on the worst case reduction by analyzing
past reductions. In this context, the computation of a causal
consumption policy is an open problem. In this paper we consider
a battery user interested in charging her battery while minimizing
the worst case cost, where the total cost is a sum of two terms
that reflect (i) the total energy consumption and (ii) the distance
to a full battery at the deadline. We prove that there exists a
causal consumption policy that minimizes the worst-case cost of
the user. We find that the policy is threshold-based and give an
efficient method to explicitly compute it at any time based solely
on knowledge of past reductions, of the service guarantees and
on the current distance to completion. Our method is based on
the use of service curves and game theory.
Index Terms—Service Curves; Battery Management; Ad-
justable Supply; Repeated Game; Worst-Case Cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Flexible Electricity Services
Flexible electricity services are one of the tools used by
utilities to control energy flows and cope with variability in
demand and supply. Flexible services can use control by price
or by quantity. Control by price has been extensively studied
and convergence to an optimal allocation has been showed
when users maximize a utility function that depends on the
shed load (e.g., [4], [8]). In this paper, we are interested in
the latter case, more precisely in adjustable services. Such
services are successfully performed by many companies (Ro-
mande Energie, Peakshaver, Voltalis): for example, Voltalis
controls residential electrical heating via on-off signals and
guarantees a heating interruption of at most one hour per
day; similarly, Romande Energie offers, in addition to a non
controlled service, an interruptible service where supply can
be interrupted for at most 4 hours every day [1], [2], [9],
recommended for water boilers, or electrical heating.
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Adjustable services typically target large, flexible loads,
that have a significant impact on the energy flows in the
grid. Consumers adhere to such adjustable services because
the rate per kWh is much lower than that of regular full
service contracts. In addition to the traditional thermal loads,
plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) are excellent candidates for
such adjustable services: they are large, flexible consumers.
Moreover, an important part of the cost associated with the
EV is refueling, and it is always interesting to have a lower
rate for battery recharging. From the grid operator perspective,
EVs strain the electrical grid, so it is also important to be able
take advantage of their flexibility.1
A suitable way to model “adjustable contracts” is via a
service curve contract [7]. Such a contract stipulates that
the consumer is guaranteed an amount of energy of at least
β(t) kWh over any time window of length t hours, where
β is a non-decreasing function called “the service curve”. In
particular, we consider a so-called “load-switching” service
curve, defined in detail in Section II-A, which allows unre-
stricted consumption up to a maximum power for at least
a predetermined fraction f of each day, and thus service
interruptions during at most (1− f) of each day.
B. Flexible Battery Charging
We consider a consumer who owns a battery that needs to
be charged before a given deadline. In addition to the standard
electricity contract that guarantees full service availability, she
has agreed with the utility on a service curve contract that
provides an adjustable service, adapted for battery charging
(large maximum power). This second contract specifies a
flat rate per kWh, typically much lower than that of the
standard contract, and a “load-switching” curve, similar to
the one currently used for water boilers or electrical resistive
heaters. The consumer has access to a differentiated service:
the battery can be plugged either on the “adjustable service”
plug (cheaper), or on the regular plug (much more expensive).
We assume that the consumer takes advantage of the differ-
entiated service. For this, she has selected the “load-switching”
contract that is least inconvenient to her in the long run: she
should not be affected by service reductions and should have a
full battery at the deadline (hence the flexibility of the charging
process). She thus wants to have the illusion of an “always
available” system, with transparent service reductions. Such
contracts are very interesting for companies, such as the Post
1It is estimated that a transition from fossil-fuel powered vehicles to PEVs
entails a significant increase in global electricity consumption (roughly from
simple to double). Such a transition would require important investments in
the electrical grid infrastructure, as it is currently unable to support such a
dramatic increase.
2Office, who operate a large fleet of PEVs during well defined
time periods (such as, say, from 6am to 6pm). Moreover,
individual PEV owners can also benefit from a well tailored
adjustable service, despite being affected by “range anxiety”:
they are always given the option of advancing the charging
deadline, or, in exceptional situations, connecting the battery
to the regular plug, thus getting full service (at a higher price).
In this paper we assume that the energy flow is from the
grid to the battery, i.e., the battery is not feeding energy into
the grid (the other cases are for further study). Thus the battery
appears to the grid as an elastic load.
To summarize, on a day-to-day basis, the consumer uses
the adjustable service defined by a service curve and wishes
to have her battery fully charged at the deadline while paying
as little as possible to the electricity provider. We model the
consumer cost as the sum of (i) the amount of money paid for
the service at a flat rate (e.g., the electricity bill) and (ii) the
disutility of a discharged battery expressed as the distance to
completion at the deadline (e.g., how far the battery is from
being full at the deadline). We choose weights for these two
terms such that the second term dominates the first, i.e., the
minimum cost consumption always achieves having the battery
closest to full at the deadline.
The consumer is risk-averse: by observing past reductions
and through knowledge of the service curve, she wishes to
protect against worst-case future reduction signals and thus to
minimize the worst-case cost.2 Here is where the service curve
plays an important role: we show that the worst-case signals
can be anticipated. In particular, if the worst-case reduction
means missing the deadline, then thanks to the chosen cost
function, the consumer will do everything in her power to have
a battery as close to full as allowed by the service reductions.
A naive approach for such a consumer consists in always
consuming as much as allowed, until the consumption needs
are satisfied. However, the marginal advancement of state
of charge is decreasing with respect to the instantaneous
consumed power [6], [10], due to inefficiencies and thermal
losses (which are quadratic with respect to current), so that the
speed at which the battery gets charged increases sublinearly
with the instantaneous power consumption. Therefore, the
naive approach is wasteful and is generally not optimal. In
contrast, an alert battery user can keep a record of past service
reductions and infer bounds on future reductions, thanks to the
service curve guarantee. In this context, the computation of an
optimal causal consumption policy is an open problem.
C. Contributions
We prove that there exists a causal consumption policy that
minimizes the worst-case cost of the consumer. We find that
the policy is threshold-based and can be explicitly computed:
at a given time the optimal consumption is determined as the
minimum of the allowed consumption and a certain adaptive
threshold that depends solely on the knowledge of past reduc-
tions, on the service curve, and on the current completion level.
Incidentally, we find that the optimal policy corrsponds to a
2This can be done automatically by a device that controls the charging
process based on monitoring the state of the battery and past reduction signals.
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium: our method of proof shows
that, at each time step, the policy that minimizes the worst-
case cost corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of a two-player
zero-sum game played by the consumer and the distribution
system operator, and we give a general method for constructing
an optimal causal consumption policy based on refining such
Nash equilibria to include decisions taken at each time step
(like in a multi-stage game).
Outline: In Section II-A we describe the service curve
contract that binds the distribution system operator and the
consumer. In Section II we describe formally the consumer
problem and we give the main result (the optimal consumption
policy) in the form of Algorithm 1. Sections IV and V
are dedicated to the proof of this result. In Section III-C
we evaluate numerically the optimal consumption policy, the
omniscient, and the greedy one. We conclude in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND DEFINITION OF OPTIMAL
POLICY
In this section we first we describe the system model and the
adjustable service contract; then we give a model of the battery
(which can easily be generalized to other energy-hungry tasks
involving storage systems). Next, we explicitly describe the
cost of the consumer as previously motivated. Last, we define
worst-case optimal policies.
Notation: We introduce various notations which we sum-
marize in Table I. We also use the following convention. For
any s ≤ t and a sequence ~x def= (xt)t, we denote by ~x:t the
sequence (xt′)t′≤t and by ~xs:t the sequence (xt′)s≤t′≤t. For
some constant c, the notation “~x ≤ c” means that xt ≤ c for
all t. Moreover, given two sequences ~x and ~y, we denote the
concatenation of the two by [~x ~y].
A. Adjustable Service
We consider a consumer that uses an adjustable service
to charge a battery by a deadline T , by drawing electricity
provided by a “Distribution System Operator” (DSO). We use
the concept of service curve contract [7] to model service
guarantees provided by the DSO for the adjustable service.
For simplicity we consider that time is discrete and slotted.
At every time slot, the DSO sends a control signal xt to the
consumer. Let zt be the net energy drawn by the consumer
from the grid in time slot t (in units of energy). The contract
between the consumer and the distribution system operator
specifies the following constraints. First,
0 ≤ zt ≤ xt ≤ x¯ for all t (1)
i.e., the consumed energy may not exceed the level xt specified
by the DSO3; x¯ is the maximum that may ever be allowed.
Second, the consumer receives the guarantee that throttling
cannot be excessive. This can be expressed by requiring
t∑
τ=t′+1
xτ ≥ β(t− t′) for all t′, t with t′ < t, (2)
3We assume zt is positive since there is no battery-to-grid flow.
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NOTATION LIST
DSO Distribution System Operator (electricity provider)
xt control signal sent by DSO, maximum amount of energy that
can be drawn in time slot t
zt energy consumed by consumer in order to charge her battery in
time slot t; cannot exceed xt
pi used to denote a consumer policy, i.e., a mapping between
a sequence of control signals ~x and corresponding charging
decisions (energy consumption) ~z, Section II-D
B(~z1:t) = B0 +
∑t
s=1 f(zs), battery level at the end of time slot t
given feasible consumptions ~z
T deadline at which the consumer wishes to have her battery fully
charged
p the price of energy bought by the consumer
K factor of disutility of discharged battery at the deadline T
f(z) increase in battery level when consuming z units of energy,
Section II-B
φ(z)
def
= pz−Kf(z), the increase in the cost of the consumer when
consuming z units of energy, Section II-C
c(·, ·) c(pi, ~x) def= ∑Tt=1 φ(zt), the cost of policy pi under control ~x
β(·) service curve; in this paper we use load-switching curves (3)
with parameters t0, t1, and x¯ (see below)
t0, t1 the load-switching service curve guarantees maximum service
interruption of t0 during any time window of length t1
x¯ maximum amount of energy that can ever be consumed in one
time slot
0 𝑡0 = 1 48 49 
𝛽(𝜏) (Wh) 
𝑡1 = 24  ¿ (hours) 
Fig. 1. The “load-switching” service curve β, shown here, allows the DSO
to switch off the load for at most 60 minutes every day; it also allows more
complex control signals, such as, for example, reducing the load to x¯/2 for
120 minutes every day.
where β : N → [0,+∞) is a function defined at contract
subscription time, called a service curve. Specifically, we take
β to be a load-switching service curve with parameters t0, t1,
and x¯, i.e., the function illustrated in Figure 1 and defined by
β(t) = t0x¯ bt1/t0(
t/t0), (3)
where bs(x)
def
= max {x, bx/scs+ 1} − (bx/sc+ 1). This spe-
cific choice of service curve corresponds to a service that may
be interrupted at most t0 time units every t1 time units; in
particular, the electricity contracts currently used for boilers
and heating [1], [2], [9] can be modeled this way.
It was shown [7, Theorem 1] that a sequence of control
signals ~x def= (xt)t satisfies the service curve constraint in (2)
if and only if ~x ≤ x¯ and the allowed energy consumption
over any time window of length t1 is at least β(t1). In other
words, the structure of the function β allows us to replace the
condition (2) by the simpler one:
t+t1∑
τ=t+1
xτ ≥ β(t1) for all t. (4)
We say that a sequence of control signals ~x is feasible if it
satisfies (1) and (2) or, equivalently, (1) and (4).
B. Storage Model
The consumer wants to charge a battery before a given dead-
line T without knowledge of the future signals x1, . . . , xT . At
the end of time slot t the battery state is characterized by a
storage level 0 ≤ B(t) ≤ B¯, where B¯ is the energy capacity of
the battery4. The consumer arrives at the end of time slot t = 0
with a battery in state B(0) = B0. She needs to immediately
choose a charging strategy that ensures (if possible) a full
battery at the end of time step T . To this end, she uses the
knowledge of the service curve, of the past control signals,
and of the battery characteristics.
The battery charging procedure consumes an amount of
energy zt during slot t, with 0 ≤ zt ≤ xt ≤ x¯, as imposed
by (1), where x¯ is the maximum allowed. By the end of time
slot t, the battery level increases by
∆B(t)
def
= B(t)−B(t− 1) = f(zt),
where f : [0, x¯] → [0,∞) is a differentiable, concave,
increasing function, that satisfies f(0) = 0 (we do not consider
battery leakage, a battery will not lose charge if it is left
alone). The concavity assumption reflects the decrease in
energy efficiency with power (at high enough power) [6].
The charging stops when the battery is full. Hence, zt must
always be chosen such that there is no overflow: B(t) ≤ B¯,
or equivalently, since B(t) = B(t− 1) + f(zt),
f(zt) ≤ B¯ −B(t− 1) for all t. (5)
We prolong the inverse f−1 : [0,∞)→ [0, x¯] ∪ {+∞}: for
all y > f(x¯) we set f−1(y) = +∞.
The results presented in this paper hold for any f satisfying
the aforementioned assumptions. For the numerical evaluation
(Section III-C) we use a simple quadratic function f to reflect
a certain charging efficiency η and an internal resistance ρ
(e.g., which accounts for thermal losses of the converter):
f(z) = ηz − ρz2. (6)
This entails a linearly decreasing energy efficiency with z. In
this setting, x¯ satisfies x¯ < η2ρ . The reason is that, for this
simple model, consuming an amount of energy larger than η2ρ
in a time slot, say η2ρ +  ( > 0), has the same effect on
the battery as consuming 2 less, i.e., η2ρ − . More realistic
models [6] have been proposed, and our results apply mutatis-
mutandis: such models simply provide a different f .
C. Cost Function
The total cost incurred by the customer is a sum of
her consumption cost at a flat rate p (i.e., the electricity
bill) and a linear term reflecting the disutility of having a
discharged battery at the deadline T . It can be written as∑T
t=1 pzt+K(B¯−B(T )), where K is a positive constant. We
must pick K “large enough”, i.e., K ≥ pf ′(x¯) . This is needed
4B(t) represents a scaling of the actual state of charge, since EV batteries
are not discharged below a certain minimal level.
4to ensure that the battery level attained at the deadline by the
consumption sequence of minimum cost is always the highest
among all other consumption sequences. We give more precise
arguments below.
Denote the cost increment at each time step by
φ(z)
def
= pz −Kf(z).
Consider only the controllable cost of the consumer (i.e., the
part of the cost that depends on ~z); it can be expressed as
C(~z1:T ), or in short C(~z), where
C(~zt1:t2) =
t2∑
s=t1
φ(zs). (7)
Consider a hypothetical omniscient consumer who knows
the future in advance. For a given control sequence ~x =
(xt)
T
t=1 she can determine an optimal consumption sequence:
ω∗(~x) = ~z∗ such that
~z∗ ∈ arg min{C(~z) : ~z ≤ ~x and ~z satisfies (5)}. (8)
Since we consider risk-averse consumers (that care more about
having a full battery at the end of the day than about the
electricity bill), we want the following property verified:
For any valid consumption sequence ~z, i.e., that
satisfies (1) and (5), the level at the deadline of a
battery charging according to ~z is less or equal to
that of the same battery charging according to ~z∗.
When φ is strictly decreasing, this is readily verified. Indeed,
if with ~z∗ the battery is full at the deadline, then the property
holds. Otherwise, if the level at the deadline with ~z∗ is B∗ <
B¯, then it must be that ~z∗ = ~x. Indeed, otherwise there exists
a time slot t when z∗t < xt, and by increasing consumption at
this time step by 0 <  < min{xt−z∗t , f−1(B¯−B∗)} we get a
better filled battery and a lower cost, since φ(z∗t ) > φ(z
∗
t +).
If K is too small, i.e., K ≤ pf ′(0) , then φ is increasing, and
the optimal choice is to always consume nothing. Intuitively,
the electricity bill matters much more than having a full
battery, so the consumer never consumes. When K is between
the two values, i.e., pf ′(0) ≤ K ≤ pf ′(x¯) , the consumer might
choose to charge less in order to get a smaller bill, and the
desired property again does not hold.
Note: In addition to a larger electricity bill, charging at
high power is undesirable in general since it may cause
undercharging: a battery that is charged at high power reaches
too fast the upper voltage limit beyond which the battery
electrodes may be damaged, and the charging process is
stopped early. However, in this paper we consider EV batteries
that use a relatively small depth-of-discharge, as is common
for hybrid vehicles (i.e., the battery is never discharged below
a certain level: B(t) represents a scaling of the actual state of
charge), hence undercharge may safely be neglected [6].
D. Consumer Policies
At every time slot the consumer knows the maximum
amount of energy xt allowed by the DSO and responds by
choosing an actual energy consumption zt, using a consumer
policy, which is defined as a mapping pi : ~x → ~z. More
precisely, for any 0 ≤ s, t < T , we use the following
definitions:
• Let Xs(~x:t) ⊂ (R+)s be the set of sequences of feasible
DSO control signals for the next s time steps, i.e., that
satisfy the service curve constraint (4) given (feasible)
past signals ~x:t = (. . . , x−1, x0, . . . , xt). A “policy start-
ing after time t” is a mapping XT−t(~x:t) pi7→ (R+)T−t.
• Πt(~x:t, ~z1:t) ⊂
{
pi : XT−t(~x:t)→ (R+)T−t
}
is the set of
all valid policies starting after time t, i.e. of all policies
starting after time t such that the sequence of consumed
energy decisions ~zt+1:T satisfies the constraints imposed
by the service in (1) and the battery in (5). This set
depends on the history (~x:t, ~z1:t).
• A policy pi ∈ Πt(~x:t, ~z1:t) is called causal if for any
τ = t + 1, . . . , T and for any ~y, ~y′ ∈ XT−t(~x:t) such
that ~yt+1:τ = ~y′t+1:τ , we have (pi(~y))s = (pi(~y
′))s, for
all s = t + 1, . . . , τ . In other words, the consumption
decision taken by the policy at time τ ∈ [t+ 1, ..., T ]
depends only on the present and the past up to time τ .
We denote the set of all causal and valid policies starting
after time t by Π¯t(~x:t, ~z1:t) ⊆ Πt(~x:t, ~z1:t).
For example the omniscient policy ω∗, introduced in (8)
and which produces an optimal consumption sequence, is by
definition a valid policy starting after time 0, but it is not
causal (note that it is a hypothetical policy that we use only
as a benchmark). The greedy policy, which consists in naively
consuming as much as possible given the constraints of the
service and of the battery, is a valid and causal policy.
One particular class of causal valid policies starting after
time t is the class of threshold policies, which we now define.
Given an adaptive threshold function h(s, b) ∈ [0, x¯] that
depends on the current time s > t and on past decisions
~z1:s−1 via the current battery level b, the threshold policy σh
is defined by
σh(~x)(1)
def
= z1 = min{x1, h(0, B0), f−1(B¯)},
if the policy starts at t = 0
σh(~x)(s)
def
= zs = min{xt, h(s− 1, B(~z1:s−1)),
f−1(B¯ −B(~z1:s−1))}. (9)
where we denote the battery level at the end of time slot t by
B(~z1:t) = B0 +
∑t
s=1 f(zs), given feasible decisions ~z. In
other words, this policy sets the consumption decision to the
value of the threshold if this is possible given the constraints
of the service and of the battery, else to the maximum allowed.
By construction, a threshold policy starting after time t is valid
and causal. The greedy policy is a threshold policy σx¯ (with
h(s, b) = x¯ for all s, b).
E. Definition of Optimal Policy
Intuitively, an optimal policy is a causal policy that min-
imizes the worst case cost for the consumer: it minimizes
her energy consumption, hence aims to charge the battery
at low power, while ensuring a full battery at the deadline,
whenever the service reduction signals allow it. Such a policy
is necessarily pessimistic: at any time step t it does not know
the future, but using the knowledge of the service curve
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against the worst future reduction signal (that maximizes her
cost). We call this property t-optimality. The optimal policy
updates its decisions at every time step, since observed service
reductions may prove to be less constraining than the worst
case. It is thus t-optimal, for all time steps t. We now define
rigorously the worst-case cost of a policy, t-optimality, and
optimality.
For a valid policy starting after time t, pi ∈ Πt(~x:t, ~z1:t), the
cost of pi under control signals ~x over t1, . . . , t2 is denoted by
ct1:t2(pi, ~x)
def
= C(~zt1:t2), with ~z = pi(~x) and C defined in (7).
The worst case cost of pi ∈ Πt(~x:t, ~z1:t) is
c¯(pi)
def
= max
~yt+1:T∈XT−t(~x:t)
{ct+1:T (pi, ~yt+1:T )} .
Informally, the worst case cost of a valid policy starting after
t is the maximum cost that this policy may incur under all
possible future control signals, given the constraints imposed
by the past and present.
Definition 1: We say that a causal and valid policy starting
at time t, pi∗,t ∈ Πt(~x:t, ~z1:t), is t-optimal if and only if pi∗,t
minimizes the worst-case cost over all other valid policies
starting after time t.
Formally, pi∗,t is t-optimal if and only if
c¯(pi∗,t) = min
pi′∈Πt(~x:t,~z1:t)
c¯(pi′).
Our risk-adverse consumer wants to find a policy that is
causal and t-optimal at every time t, taking into consideration
what she can observe up to time t, and for every time t =
1, . . . , T . This motivates the following definitions.
Definition 2: We are given a causal and valid policy starting
after t, pi ∈ Π¯t(~x:t, ~z1:t), some s > t, and some fixed feasible
control signal ~yt+1:s given ~x:t. The restricted policy starting
after time s given ~yt+1:s, denoted as pi|~yt+1:s , is defined by
pi|~yt+1:s(~y′s+1:T ) def= ~zs+1:T
where ~zt+1:T = pi([~yt+1:s ~y′s+1:T ]) for any feasible signal
~y′s+1:T ∈ XT−s([~x:t ~yt+1:s]).
The restricted policy is well defined since, by causality, the
decisions ~zt+1:s are the same irrespective of the future signal
~y′s+1:T . The restricted policy is valid and causal: pi|~yt+1:s ∈
Π¯s([~x:t ~yt+1:s], ~z1:s).
Informally, given a valid and causal policy pi starting after
time t, the restricted policy starting after time s > t is the
policy obtained by applying pi in the future after s, given that
we now know the control signal ~xt+1:s up to time s.
Definition 3: We say that a causal and valid policy starting at
time 0, pi∗ ∈ Π¯0(~x:0), is optimal if and only if for any time step
0 ≤ t < T and for any feasible control signal ~y1:t ∈ Xt(~x:0),
the restricted policy pi∗|~y1:t is t-optimal.
Informally, an optimal policy is a valid and causal policy
that has the following property: for each time step t, after
observing the t first control signals, the resulting restricted
policy starting after t has a worst case cost that matches the
smallest worst case cost of any valid policy (not necessarily
causal) starting at t.
In the next section we prove by construction the existence
of an optimal policy.
III. EXISTENCE AND COMPUTATION OF AN OPTIMAL
POLICY
In this section we present our main result: there exists
a causal energy consumption policy for the consumer that
minimizes her cost in the worst-case scenario permitted by the
service curve contract. We first show the main technical result,
which is the construction of a t-optimal policy as a threshold
policy. Then we show how to derive an optimal policy from
any t-optimal policy.
A. Existence and Computation of a t-Optimal Policy
The following theorem states that there exists a threshold
policy that is t-optimal. This result is useful for determining
an optimal policy.
Theorem 1: Consider an adjustable service specified using a
load-switching service curve β with parameters t0, t1, and x¯,
like in (3). Given past decisions ~z1:t and feasible past control
signals ~x:t there exists a constant gt, which can be computed
as a function of past signals and decisions at the end of time
slot t, such that the fixed threshold policy σgt is t-optimal.
The constant gt is given by gt = h∗T (t, B(~z1:t)), with
h∗T (s, b)=

f−1( B¯−bqT (s)+1 ), if
B¯−b
qT (s)+1
≤ f(rT (s)),
f−1( B¯−b−f(rT (s))qT (s) ), if
B¯−b
qT (s)+1
> f(rT (s))
and qT (s) > 0,
∞, otherwise,
(10)
where qT (s) ∈ N and 0 ≤ rT (s) < x¯ are the unique values
such that max (HT (s), 0) = qT (s)x¯+ rT (s), with
HT (s)
def
= β(t1)−
s∑
t=T−t1+1
xt. (11)
The proof of this result is lengthy and relies on a game-
theoretic approach. It is given in Section IV.
B. Existence and Computation of an Optimal Policy
The following theorem constructs an optimal policy from
any t-optimal policy and can thus be combined with the
previous section to obtain an optimal policy.
Theorem 2: Assume that we have a method to compute a t-
optimal policy pi∗,t ∈ Π¯t(~x:t, ~z1:t) at every time t = 0, 1, ...T
from any past control signals and decisions (~x:t, ~z1:t) (note
that pi∗,t must be feasible and causal).
Let ~x:0 be some arbitrary feasible sequence of control
signals. For t = 1, ..., T , define the consumption z∗t iteratively
as follows:
• z∗1 is the decision taken by the policy pi
∗,0 given ~x:0
• z∗t is the decision taken by the policy pi
∗,t−1
given (~x:(t−1), ~z∗1:(t−1))
Then the policy pi∗ defined by (x1, ..., xT ) 7→ (z∗1 , ..., z∗T )is
optimal.
The proof is given in Section V. Note that the policy pi∗,t
in the theorem is a feasible and causal policy starting after
time t whereas the policy pi∗ is a feasible and causal policy
starting after time 0.
6A direct consequence of Theorem 2 is the following:
Corollary 1: The threshold policy σh∗T , where h
∗
T is defined
in (10), is an optimal policy.
Thus, Algorithm 1 implements an optimal policy.
Algorithm 1 Optimal (Causal) Policy
Require: ~x:0, B0, B¯, T , load-switching service curve β with
parameters t0, t1, x¯, like in (3)
Ensure: ~x:0 satisfies service curve β
1: H ← β(t1)−
∑0
s=T−t1+1 xs.
2: Current battery level is B ← B0
3: for t = 1 to T do
4: q ← bmax{0,H}/x¯c
5: r ← max{0, H} − qx¯
6: h← x¯
7: if B¯−B/q+1 ≤ f(r) then
8: h← f−1 ((B¯−B)/(q+1))
9: else if q > 0 then
10: h← f−1 ([B¯−B−f(r)]/q)
11: end if
12: Receive signal xt
13: Consume zt
def
= min{xt, h}
14: B ← B + f(zt)
15: H ← H − xt
16: end for
C. Numerical Illustration
We compare numerically the cost of using Algorithm 1 to
the costs of the omniscient policy ω∗ and of the greedy policy
γ ≡ σx¯ that consists of charging the battery by consuming the
maximum allowed energy in each time slot. We consider that
the increase in battery level is given by f defined in (6) with a
charging efficiency η = 90% and an internal resistance ρ such
that the resistive loss when charged at maximum intensity is
1− α = 30% (hence ρ = ηαx¯ ).
We express the amount of required charge B¯ − B0 as the
fraction w of the time before the deadline that the greedy
policy γ needs to charge the battery when the control signal
always allows maximum energy per time slot x¯. Specifically,
B¯ − B0 = wT · f(x¯). Thus, a small w indicates that there is
a lot of flexibility in the schedule.
We consider a load-switching curve β with periodicity of
the derivative of t1 = 24h, maximum service interruption
time of t0 = 7h, and maximum power x¯. The battery needs
to be charged within T = 10h from the present time. We
generate random control signals ~x(2−t1):T (i.e., past signals
~x(2−t1):0 and signals during the consumption period x1:T )
that satisfy the service curve constraint: all signals previous
to x2−t1 are set to x¯, and for each t = 2 − t1, . . . , T , we
pick xt uniformly at random between the least allowed service
max{0, β(t1)−
∑t−1
s=t−t1+1 xs} and the maximum service x¯.
For such randomly generated control signals (that by definition
satisfy the service curve) we evaluate the cost of the three
policies.
First, for a given control signal, in Figure 2 we show a run
of the three policies in two scenarios: when the deadline T
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(b) When the shaded area begins, the deadline is advanced from T = 10h
to the end of the shaded area, T ≈ 7h
Fig. 2. Sample runs when the battery can be filled by consuming x¯ per time
slot for a fraction w = 1/3 of the time before the deadline. We show two
cases: 2(a) – when the consumer allows the causal optimal policy to run until
the end, and 2(b) – when the consumer panics and advances the deadline
mid-charge. The greedy policy finishes charging first, but consumes the most.
The threshold of the omniscient policy is visible, as well as the evolving
(decreasing) threshold of the causal optimal policy.
remains the same throughout the entire period (Figure 2(a)),
and when it is changed mid-charge by an anxious consumer
(Figure 2(b)). In both cases, the consumption curve of the
greedy policy coincides with the control signal (maximum
power allowed), since it consumes as much as it is given (until
it charges the battery). The adjustable threshold followed by
the optimal policy is visible: the optimal policy consumes less
than the threshold only when it is not allowed to reach it
by the control signals. In the second case, we see that the
optimal policy adapts to the new, nearer deadline and succeeds
to charge the battery before reaching it, while still consuming
less than the greedy policy in period in which the two overlap.
Note that if the battery cannot be filled before the deadline,
the three policies behave identically and consume everything
that is allowed by the control signal. Indeed, the omniscient
policy knows the future, the causal policy considers the worst
case future signal, and the greedy policy does this by default.
Thus, the three policies can only be distinguished when
the control signals allow the battery to be filled before the
deadline, which all three achieve (by construction). In this
case, the amount of consumed energy differs for the three.
For this reason, in what follows we only consider cases where
the battery is is filled by the three policies and compare their
resulting energy consumption.
Consider a given required charge w = B¯−B0Tf(x¯) , a given
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Fig. 3. Empirical CDF of the relative cost (12) for the three policies for 1000
randomly generated control signals that satisfy the load-switching service
curve; the performance of the omniscient policy is represented in dashed lines,
the causal-optimal policy in full lines, and the greedy policy in dash-dot lines.
Each plot corresponds to a different required charge w that can be obtained
by consuming the maximum allowed energy per slot x¯ during wT slots.
control signal ~x that allows a full charge of the battery, and a
policy pi that takes advantage of ~x and sets a consumption
sequence ~z = pi(~x) that indeed achieves a full battery
B(pi(~x)) = B¯ at T . We define the relative cost of pi under
signal ~x as the ratio between its total cost
∑T
t=1 pzt =
c1:T (pi, ~x) +KB¯ and the cost in a hypothetical setting when
the greedy policy is used without any restrictions from the
DSO (xt = x¯ for all t). The numerator is in this case just
the energy bill, since pi fills the battery and there is no final
penalty. The value of the denominator is the cost when the
battery is charged by consuming the maximum energy per
time slot (in the least efficient way). Specifically, the relative
cost is
cr(pi, ~x) =
c1:T (pi, ~x) +KB¯
pwT x¯
=
∑T
t=1 zt
wTx¯
∈ [0, 1]. (12)
Finally, we can compare the performance of the three
policies in terms of the relative cost for different values of
w. In Figure 3, for 9 values of w we plot the CDF of the
relative cost for the three policies obtained over 1000 random
control signals that satisfy the service curve. We observe that
the cost of the causal optimal policy is typically closer to the
one of the omniscient policy. We stress that for any control
signal ~x the cost of the three policies is always ordered, i.e.,
pi∗ is always better than γ: c(ω∗, ~x) ≤ c(pi∗, ~x) ≤ c(γ, ~x).
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let us consider that the Distribution System Operator (DSO)
is adversarial and wants to maximize the cost of the consumer.
We study this scenario because the consumer wants to find the
best response against the worst control signal allowed by the
service curve. In reality the DSO will most likely take milder
actions that suit such objectives as balancing energy flows, or
controlling network state.
For ease of presentation, we prove the theorem for t=0
(hence no past decisions), with an initial battery level B0,
without loss of generality. Indeed, the past decisions contribute
only to increasing the initial level of the battery. Let us proceed
with the steps needed to prove Theorem 1.
A. Game-Theoretical Approach
Consider the (virtual) game between a player 1, called
“consumer”, and a player 2, called “DSO”. The consumer
chooses a policy pi ∈ Π0(~x:0) and DSO chooses a control
signal ~x ∈ XT (~x:0). The benefit to the consumer is −c(pi, ~x),
to DSO it is c(pi, ~x). This is the simplest of all games, namely
a zero-sum simultaneous game with 2 players. Assume that
best responses are well defined and let x∗(pi) [resp. pi∗(~x)]
denote the set of best responses to pi [resp. to ~x].
We show that 0-optimal policies correspond to a Nash Equi-
librium [5], [11] of this game; more precisely, a consumer’s
0-optimal policy can be obtained as her best response in a
Nash equilibrium:
Lemma 1: If (pi, ~x) is a Nash equilibrium, then pi is 0-
optimal.
Proof: Since ~x is a best response to pi, then c(pi, ~x′) ≤
c(pi, ~x) for any ~x′ ∈ XT (~x:0). Thus c¯(pi) = c(pi, ~x).
Similarly pi is a best response to ~x, thus c(pi, ~x) ≤ c(pi′, ~x)
for any pi′ ∈ Π0(~x:0). Now c(pi′, ~x) ≤ c¯(pi′), by definition of
a max, and hence c¯(pi) = c(pi, ~x) ≤ c(pi′, ~x) ≤ c¯(pi′), which
shows that pi is 0-optimal.
(Note that it is not clear that the converse is true.)
Therefore the problem is to find a Nash equilibrium for this
game, if it exists. In other words, the “worst case” ~x∗ that
we are looking for is given by a Nash equilibrium. We can
find it as follows: first, we determine the best response of the
consumer to a given DSO control signal, i.e., the structure
of the omniscient policy ω∗(~x); second, we characterize the
DSO’s best response to this consumer policy: ~x∗(ω∗); finally,
we aim to solve the fixed point equation ~y = ~x∗(ω∗(~y)).
B. The Omniscient Policy. Best Consumer Response
In the following lemma we determine the structure of the
omniscient policy ω∗(~x) which constitutes the best response
of the consumer to a given (known) control signal ~x. We prove
it in Appendix A.
Lemma 2: Consider a battery with an initial charge B0,
and a sequence of control signals ~x:0. The omniscient cost-
minimizing policy ω∗ ∈ Π0(~x:0) defined in (8) has the
following structure: there exists a value 0 < h∗(~x) < x¯ such
that ω∗(~x)(t) = min{xt, h∗(~x)}.
Thus, if there exists a Nash equilibrium, then there exists
a “worst case” signal ~x∗ for the consumer. Assume that
we can compute this ~x∗. Lemma 2 characterizes the best
response of the consumer to this specific signal. Then a
natural candidate for a causal policy is the fixed threshold
policy σh∗(~x∗). Indeed, for the control signal ~x∗, this choice
minimizes the cost of the consumer. The following questions
remain unanswered at this point.
1) What is the “worst-case” signal ~x∗(σh) for a consumer
implementing a fixed threshold policy σh (h>0)?
2) Does there exist a Nash equilibrium?
We address them in the next section.
8C. The Best Response of the DSO. Nash Equilibrium
In the following lemma we answer the first question: if the
consumer implements a fixed threshold policy σh, what is the
worst case signal for her? We prove it in Appendix B.
Lemma 3: Consider that the consumer, with an initial battery
level B0 to be filled by time T , implements a fixed threshold
policy σh defined in (9) with h > 0 constant. Given that the
consumer has received past signals ~x:0 = (. . . , x−1, x0) (that
themselves satisfy the service curve constraints), an adversarial
DSO that wants to maximize the cost of the consumer, subject
to the β(·) service curve constraints, should send the following
signal (rT (0) is defined in Theorem 1):
x∗1 = · · · = x∗τ = x¯; x∗τ+1 = rT (0); x∗τ+2 = · · · = x∗T = 0.
Intuitively, if the DSO delivers maximum service in the
beginning, it alleviates her service constraints for the end
of the desired charging period. This allows her to interrupt
the service after some time until the deadline T . We stress
again that this malicious behaviour may be encountered in
practice only coincidentally, specifically if it happens to suit
the real interests of the DSO. We study this scenario because
the consumer wants to be shielded from interruptions.
It is important to note that for any fixed threshold policy
σh, the signal that maximizes cost is the ~x∗ in Lemma 3 and
does not depend on h. Moreover, it can be computed at the
beginning of time step 1.
We can now address the second question, that con-
cerns the existence of a Nash equilibrium. We claim that
(σh∗(~x∗), ~x
∗) is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, Lemma 2 shows
that c(σh∗(~x∗), ~x∗) ≤ c(pi, ~x∗), for all pi ∈ Π(~x:0, B0), i.e., the
consumer has no incentive to choose a different policy. Then,
Lemma 3 shows that c(σh∗(~x∗), ~x∗) ≥ c(σh∗(~x∗), ~x), for all
~x ∈ XT (~x:0). Thus, σh∗(~x∗) is a 0-optimal policy. Since ~x∗
can be computed at the beginning of time step 1, σh∗(~x∗) is
causal. This concludes the proof.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We dedicate this short section to the proof of Theorem 2
because of its generality.
By construction, pi∗ is causal. Let us show that, for any t
and any ~x1:t ∈ Xt(x:0), the policy pi∗|~x1:t is t-optimal. We use
backwards induction on t. In the base case when t = T−1 we
are given all past signals ~x1:T−1 and decisions ~z1:T . Thus, by
definition, pi∗|~x1:T−1 = pi∗,T−1 ∈ Π¯T−1(~x:T−1, ~z1:T−1) which
is by hypothesis (T − 1)-optimal.
Suppose now that pi∗|~x1:t is t-optimal for some t > 0 and
any ~x1:t ∈ Xt(~x:0). Then for any ~x1:t−1 ∈ Xt−1(~x:0):
c¯(pi∗|~x1:t−1) = max
~yt:T∈XT−t+1(~x:t−1)
ct:T (pi
∗|~x1:t−1 , ~yt:T )
= max
~yt:T∈XT−t+1(~x:t−1)
{φ(pi∗|~x1:t−1(yt))+
ct+1:T (pi
∗|[~x1:t−1 yt], ~yt+1:T )} = maxyt {φ(pi
∗|~x1:t−1(yt))
+ max
~yt+1:T∈XT−t([~x:t−1 yt])
ct+1:T (pi
∗|[~x1:t−1 yt], ~yt+1:T )}
= max
yt
{φ(pi∗,t−1(yt)) + c¯(pi∗|[~x1:t−1 yt])}
≤max
yt
{φ(pi∗,t−1(yt)) + c¯(pi∗,t−1|yt)} = c¯(pi∗,t−1).
We have used the fact that all referenced policies are causal.
The inequality holds thanks to the induction hypothesis: the
policy pi∗|[~x1:t−1 yt] is t-optimal, hence its worst-case cost is
lower than the worst-case cost of any other policy, in particular
that of the restricted policy pi∗,t−1|yt .
We have shown that pi∗|~x1:t is t-optimal, since its worst-case
cost is lower than that of the t-optimal pi∗,t−1.
Incidentally, we have shown that the causal-optimal policy
in Algorithm 1 corresponds to a subgame-perfect Nash equi-
librium [5] of the multi-stage game between the consumer and
the DSO.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have characterized a causal (optimal) charging policy
that minimizes at each time step the worst-case cost for a
non-ideal battery that is subjected to service reductions with
a service curve guarantee. This policy takes the form of an
adaptive threshold policy. The cost comprises the electricity
consumption and the disutility of having a discharged battery
at the deadline. The type of cost function we consider is
tailored such that the battery is charged at the deadline unless
the overall allowed consumption is insufficient. Thus the
service reductions are rendered as transparent as possible for
the consumer. Numerical evaluations indicate that the cost of
the optimal causal policy tends to be close to the one of the
omniscient policy.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: We want to minimize
∑T
s=1 pzs − Kf(zs) over
zs ≤ xs, such that
∑T
s=1 f(zs) ≤ B¯ − B0. We write the
Lagrangian [3] of this convex optimization problem
L=
T∑
s=1
pzs−Kf(zs)+
T∑
s=1
µs(zs−xs)+λ
[
B0−B¯+
T∑
s=1
f(zs)
]
.
Then writing the KKT conditions we get:
zs = f
′−1
(
p+ µs
K − λ
)
; µs[zs − xs] = 0, µs ≥ 0;
λ
[
B(0)− B¯ +
T∑
s=1
f(zs)
]
= 0, λ ≥ 0.
We distinguish the inactive and active constraints: If for some
s we have zs = xs, then we find the value of the multiplier
µs = (K − λ)f ′(xs)− p > 0 and, by its positivity, it follows
that xs < h(λ)
def
= f ′−1
(
p
K−λ
)
. Otherwise, if zs < xs, then
zs = h(λ) ≤ xs.
We have found that a threshold h = h(λ) exists for which
the stated result holds. We now determine this threshold.
Assume that the overflow constraint is inactive (i.e., the
battery is not filled by the deadline). Then we have λ = 0, and
h(0) = f ′−1
(
p
K
)
. But K was chosen such that Kp >
1
f ′(x¯) ,
and hence h(0) > x¯ ≥ xs for all s. Thus, since K is large,
the optimal solution is to always charge at maximum intensity
zs = xs, since all xs are less than the threshold h(0).
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Fig. 4. The “flip” operation done at i. The control sequence ~y′ is obtained
from ~y by flipping yi and yj , where yj is the largest among yi, . . . , yT .
Finally, let the overflow constraint be active (i.e., the battery
is filled by the deadline). We must determine h(λ) such that
B0 − B¯ +
∑
s:xs<h(λ)
f(xs) +
∑
s
1{xs≥h(λ)}f(h(λ)) = 0.
Consider wlog. that the xs are sorted in decreasing order.
Due to the monotonicity of f , the threshold h(λ) is unique.
Consider t∗, the largest t such that xt ≥ h(λ) > xt+1
(by convention xT+1 = 0). In other words, t∗ satisfies
B¯ −B0 −
∑T
s=t∗+1 f(xs) ≤ t∗f(xt∗). Hence,
h(λ) = f−1
(
B¯ −B0 −
∑T
s=t∗+1 f(xs)
t∗
)
.
Note: If we consider f(z) = ηz − ρz2, then t∗ is the
largest t such that
tη2 + 4ρ
(
B0 +
T∑
s=t+1
f(s)− B¯
)
<0.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof: Denote σ(t) =
∑0
s=t−t1+1 xs. Since xs ≥ 0,
we have that (σ(t))Tt=1 is a decreasing sequence. From The-
orem 2 of [7] it follows that there are T linear constraints
(C1), . . . , (CT ) imposed by the service curve β on the control
signals, where (Ct) is:
(Ct) : σ(t) +
t∑
s=1
xs ≥ β(t1).
Suppose we have a sequence ~x∗ of signals like in the lemma
statement. By definition they satisfy (CT ) (with equality if
H > 0, or otherwise ~x∗ ≡ 0). Since x∗s = 0 for all s ≥
τ + 2, and since σ(t) is a decreasing sequence, the ~x∗ also
satisfy (Cτ+1), . . . , (CT−1). Moreover, since the x∗s take the
maximum value x∗s = x¯ for all 1 ≤ s ≤ τ , and since ~x:0
is a valid sequence of controls, it follows that the remaining
constraints (C1), . . . , (Cτ ) are also satisfied.
Consider a sequence of signals ~y = (y1, . . . , yT ) that
satisfies the service curve constraints (Ct). Pick a time instant
i such that there exists a further time instant i′ > i with
yi < yi′ . Denote j = arg max{yi′ : i′ > i}. Then the “flipped”
sequence at i defined as ~y′ = (y1, . . . , yj , . . . , yi, . . . , yT ) (see
Figure 4) also satisfies the service curve constraint and, under
a consumer threshold policy σh, has a cost that is at least as
large as the one of the original control sequence. The first
claim is true: only constraints (Ci), . . . , (Cj) are impacted by
the flip, but since yj > yi we have that
t∑
s=1
y′s ≥
t∑
s=1
ys ≥ β(t1)− σ(t)
for all i ≤ t ≤ j (since ~y satisfies the constraints). To show
the second claim, consider the cost difference between the two
scenarios
c(σh, ~y)− c(σh, ~y′) =
T∑
s=i
φ(zs)− φ(z′s),
where ~z and ~z′ are the sequences of consumed energy at
each time step by a threshold policy under signals ~y and ~y′,
respectively.
Notice that we have that
∑
s f(zs) =
∑
s f(z
′
s). Indeed, if
for one signal sequence the battery is filled, then it is also
filled for the other one, and, vice-versa, if the battery is not
filled for one, then it is not filled for the other. In the latter
case the same energy is consumed (only the order differs).
Thus a difference in cost may only occur when the battery
is filled before the deadline, and it originates from the linear
consumption term in φ. In this setting, consider the time slot
k when the battery reaches the maximum charge for signal ~y
and the corresponding time slot k′ for ~y′.
If k ≤ i, the cost difference is zero (at time i the consump-
tion remains the same, despite a larger allowed energy).
Suppose that zi=z′i. Then either h < min{yi, y′i}, or k′ =
k = i and the required energy to finalize the battery charge is
less than yi. In both cases the flip does not impact the cost.
Otherwise, we have zi<z′i. It must be that i≤k′≤k. Suppose
k′=i<k. We have
c(σh, ~y)− c(σh, ~y′) =
k∑
s=i
φ(zs)− φ(z′s)
=
k∑
s=i
φ(zs)− φ(z′i) = p
(
k∑
s=i
zs − z′i
)
< 0,
since f(z′i) =
∑k
s=i f(zs) ≥ f
(∑k
s=i zs
)
and f ′ > 0.
Otherwise, k′ > i. Since consumption at times steps s =
i+1, . . . , k′−1 coincides (zs = z′s), we have that
c(σh, ~y)− c(σh, ~y′) = p
k∑
s=k′+1
(zs + zi + zk′ − z′i − z′k′) .
Necessarily zk′ ≥ z′k′ . Since y′i > y′s for all s ≥ i (by
definition), it follows that z′i > z
′
k′ and z
′
i > zs for all s ≥ i.
We apply Lemma 4 (with y := z′i, x0 := z
′
k′) and conclude
that the difference in cost is negative.
Hence for any signal that satisfies the service curve we can
apply the “flip” operation until the resulting signal is sorted
decreasingly, and the cost will not decrease. Thus, a cost-
maximizing signal can be rendered decreasing.
Consider now a decreasing signal ~y, and let us increase
the allowed consumption in the beginning of the period and
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decrease it toward the end. Formally, let i = min{` : y` < x¯},
j = max{` : y` > 0}, and α = min{x¯ − yi, yj}. The “α-
unbalanced” signal defined as ~y′ = (x¯, . . . , yi + α, . . . , yj −
α, 0, . . . , 0) (see Figure 5) satisfies the service curve constraint
and increases the cost for the consumer. The first claim is
readily verified by checking (Ck), . . . , (C`).
For the second claim, if h ≤ yi then using ~y′ the cost is
either the same (if zj < yj − α), or it is strictly larger, as we
are limiting consumption at time j while the same energy is
consumed at time i in the two scenarios.
If h > yi, then we distinguish two cases:
1) The battery is not filled using ~y. We have
f(min{yi + α, h}) + f(yj − α) ≤ f(yi + α) + f(yj − α)
≤ f(yi) + f(yj),
since f is concave increasing and yi ≥ yj . Thus, the battery is
not filled using ~y′ either. The cost increases, since φ is convex
decreasing and
φ(min{yi + α, h}) + φ(yj − α) ≥ φ(yi + α) + φ(yj − α)
≥ φ(yi) + φ(yj) = φ(zi) + φ(zj).
2) The battery is filled using ~y. Consider the time slot k
when this occurs. Since y′i > yi and y
′
s = ys for all i < s < j,
it follows that at the beginning of time slot k a larger battery
level is attained by using ~y′ than by using ~y. Thus, if the
battery is filled for ~y′, then f(z′i) + f(z
′
k) = f(zi) + f(zk),
where z′i > zi = yi and z
′
k < zk ≤ yk ≤ yi, and hence
the cost increases (by a similar argument to the “flip” case).
Otherwise, necessarily k = j and yj − α < zk. Thus,
φ(min{yi + α, h}) + φ(z′k) ≥ φ(yi + α) + φ(yj − α)
≥ φ(zi) + φ(zk).
Hence, for any decreasing signal we can apply successively
the “unbalancing” operation until the first ` components take
the maximum value x¯, the `+1-st component has some posi-
tive value, and the last T−`−1 components are zero.
Let us now prune such an “unbalanced” signal ~y. Let i =
max{` : y` > 0} and define α = min{yi, β(t1) − σ(T ) −∑
j yj}. The “pruned” signal is ~y′ = (x¯, . . . , yi−α, 0, . . . , 0).
Then y′ satisfies the service curve constraints and has a higher
consumer cost than ~y for a threshold policy h.
Indeed, the first claim is verified since (Ci), . . . , (CT ) are
verified by construction, and, due to the fact that y1 = · · · =
yi−1 = x¯ so are the rest of the constraints. The second
claim is also verified, since consumption is reduced, and φ
is decreasing.
Thus, consider the signal ~y∗ that maximizes cost for a
threshold policy h. It follows that it can be transformed using
the three operations above to the signal ~x∗ in the statement.
Lemma 4: If f : [0, b] → R+ is a continuously dif-
ferentiable concave increasing function with b > 0, and
the values y, x0, x1, . . . , xn, n ≥ 2 are such that: (i) there
exists 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that x0 ≤ xk, (ii) y > maxi xi,
and (iii) f(y) + f(x0) =
∑n
i=1 f(xi), then we have that
y + x0 ≥
∑n
i=1 xi.
Proof: For n = 2, assume wlog that x0 ≤ x1. If x0 > x2,
then f(x0) + f(y) > f(x2) + f(x1), which contradicts (iii).
Hence, it is also true that x0 ≤ x2 and consider x1 ≤ x2,
wlog. We have that f(y)−f(x2) = f(x1)−f(x0). If f(x1)−
f(x0) = 0, then the statement is trivially true. Otherwise, there
exist u and v, (x0 ≤ u ≤ x1 and x2 ≤ v ≤ y) such that
f(x1)− f(x0) = f ′(u)(x1 − x0) and
f(y)− f(x2) = f ′(v)(y − x2).
Since f is increasing and concave, it follows that f ′(u) >
f ′(v) > 0, and thus that x1 − x0 < y − x2.
For n > 2, we have that
∑
i 6=k xi ≤ y. Otherwise f(y) <∑
i 6=k f(xi), which again leads to a violation of (iii). Denote
x−k
def
=
∑
i 6=k
xi.
We get that
f(y)− f(x−k) ≥ f(y)−
∑
i 6=k
f(xi) = f(xk)− f(x0).
If x0 > x−k then y + x0 ≥
∑n
i=1 xi. Otherwise, assume
wlog that x−k > xk. By similar arguments to those used for
n = 2 we conclude.
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